Gen Z Revolt in Nepal: Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Engagement
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Sehar Alam (Hyogo, 2024-2025)
Overview
Recent youth-led protests in Nepal, sparked by the government’s attempt to ban social media, have ignited broader debates on digital rights, the lack of economic opportunities, and the future of democracy. This article examines how these protests intersect with the U.S.-Japan partnership and its implications for the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Using a smart power framework, this article argues that a coordinated U.S.-Japan partnership, leveraging Japan’s strengths in people-to-people diplomacy alongside the United States’ institutional and economic support, can help reinforce digital governance norms in Nepal through youth-led initiatives and civil society expertise. By improving bilateral educational programs and digital networks that mobilize Nepali citizens, the U.S.-Japan partnership would establish a model for international collaboration and shape regional digital governance in an era influenced by technology.
On September 8, 2025, protesters flooded the streets of Nepal as the country’s youth advocated for their digital rights and demanded accountability from the government for years of corruption. These protests were a result of the Nepali government’s decision to impose a social media ban as a response to criticism of the government across multiple online platforms.[1] While protests were organized by the nonprofit organization Hami Nepal, heightened tensions revealed deeper frustrations among Nepali youth about digital repression. Most of the participants were under the age of thirty, leading the protests to be informally dubbed as the “Gen Z Revolt.” Although initially peaceful, the protests escalated, resulting in over seventy protesters’ deaths and three major political party offices being burned.[2] With 56 percent of Nepal’s population under the age of thirty, limited access to economic opportunities, healthcare, and education for this large youth population poses challenges to the country’s socioeconomic development.[3]
These protests not only reflect Nepal’s weak digital governance and institutional fragility but also shed light on eroding civil liberties and public distrust across South Asia, a situation contextually relevant to U.S. and Japanese strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Since 1990, Nepal has experienced thirty-two changes in government, none of which has completed a full five-year term, illustrating the depth of political instability and public frustration with issues such as corruption.[4] Nepal’s youth-led digital protests signal a broader regional trend of youth mobilization against state-imposed restrictions on digital spaces. Similar dynamics can be seen in countries such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, highlighting a shared challenge for upholding democratic values. Understanding and supporting these movements offers a strategic opportunity for the United States and Japan to strengthen democratic norms through soft power tools focused on youth engagement and digital literacy as opposed to state-centric channels.
U.S.-Japan Partnership and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Nepal’s fragile democracy and geographic location give the United States and Japan shared incentives to support youth-led civic engagement and governance in the region. U.S. engagement in South Asia focuses on regional stability, economic growth, and democracy, guided by the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” region. This concept was first articulated by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, but was later embraced by the first Trump administration.[5] The goals outlined in the 2019 document A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, published by the U.S. Department of State, make it clear that the United States aims to ensure that “the future of the Indo-Pacific is one of freedom and openness rather than coercion and corruption.”[6] For Nepal, these objectives translate into opportunities to advance economic development and achieve democratic progress through diverse partnerships. Recognizing the importance of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the United States and Japan share goals of enhancing connectivity, investing in democratic institutions, and ensuring peace and stability in South Asia.
Although the United States and Japan have differing bilateral considerations vis-à-vis Nepal, their shared strategic interests in shaping regional dynamics in South Asia serve as a point of potential cooperation. Of course, Japanese and U.S. involvement in discussions of Nepal’s domestic governance may raise concerns about imposing on the country’s sovereignty; however, collaboration with local organizations can enhance Nepal’s autonomy by prioritizing initiatives that reflect the needs of Nepali citizens while advancing democracy. In an increasingly globalized world, achieving the objectives of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific requires coordinated action between regional and external partners. In this context, combining their respective capacities in education, cultural engagement, and institutional support, the U.S.-Japan partnership could empower Nepali youth and foster regional stability.
Japan’s Emphasis on People-Centered Diplomacy in Nepal
Although the United States and Japan both utilize a mix of soft and hard power tools, Japan’s engagement with Nepal has historically been more grounded in people-to-people diplomacy. This approach leverages mechanisms such as cultural exchange and educational programs for economic and political influence. Since 1954, these programs—and lenient student visa policies—have expanded Japan’s influence, creating long-term networks that embed Japanese diplomatic and professional norms while supporting development in Nepal.[7]
Nepal and Japan’s bilateral relationship began when Buddhist monk Ekai Kawaguchi visited Nepal in 1898, after which Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher Rana sent eight Nepali students to pursue higher education in Japan.[8] These interactions laid the foundation for diplomatic and educational ties that continue to shape Japan-Nepal relations. Building on this foundation, Japan has undertaken multiple initiatives, such as providing scholarships through the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (better known as MEXT), to strengthen bilateral ties, enhance institutional capacity in Nepal, and foster people-to-people relations.
Today, Japan remains a top destination for Nepali students, and the Nepali population living in Japan has experienced rapid growth due to Japan’s increasing demand for technical interns, skilled workers, and educational exchanges. Japan has also pursued targeted youth engagement initiatives, such as the Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths (JENESYS) Programme, which exposes young South Asians to Japanese technology, culture, and society.[9] Programs like JENESYS aim to cultivate critical thinking and cross-cultural communication skills that enable youth to participate more actively in civic life and strengthen democratic norms upon returning home. Japan’s initiatives have strengthened ties with Nepal by building long-term diplomatic benefits that create an exchange of skilled labor, economic growth, and advancement of technologies. These initiatives demonstrate Japan’s ability to deploy educational and cultural resources to generate and foster the mutual trust with Nepali youth essential for collaboration between the United States and Japan in addressing development and democratic problems in Nepal.
Japan’s longstanding relationship with Nepal reflects its investment in maintaining diplomatic ties aligned with the values of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Public diplomacy efforts, particularly through educational programs, highlight Japan’s emphasis on promoting a positive image, building a network of allies, and forging cooperative relations. By prioritizing attraction over coercion, Japan cultivates mutual trust with partner countries.
U.S. Leadership Through Institutional and Economic Support in Nepal
Nepal’s location between two powerhouses—China and India—makes it critical for U.S. national security, creating incentives for the United States to counterbalance other regional powers’ influence and reinforce democratic governance in Nepal. The U.S.-China rivalry makes American access and influence in South Asia essential for U.S. foreign policy, hence the mission of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Although the United States has traditionally relied on its relationship with India as a counterweight to China, its prioritization of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific also emphasizes strengthening stability in smaller nations such as Nepal.
The UnitedStates formally established diplomatic relations with Nepal in 1947 and has historically provided military training and capacity building, particularly during the Maoist insurgency.[10] While Japan’s military ties with Nepal have been limited, the U.S. approach reflects the deployment of a broader toolkit of so-called “smart power”—combining “soft power” tools with more traditional “hard power” economic and security engagement—that complements Japan’s people-to-people diplomacy. The United States has also relied on more traditional foreign assistance to support Nepal’s democratic development. In 1951, it became Nepal’s first international aid donor, contributing more than $1.5 billion since then to address instability and promote democratic values.[11] Notably, in 2017, the United States pledged $500 million in multiyear support through the Millennium Challenge Corporation to fund infrastructure projects. Although some Nepali commentators have expressed concerns about U.S. intentions, especially given its rivalry with China, this support demonstrates a continued commitment to governance and institution-building despite recent foreign aid cuts.[12]
Historically, U.S. funding for the public sphere and media access has helped strengthen institutions and improved public access to credible information throughout Nepal. Japan, meanwhile, puts greater emphasis on sustained social ties and youth-focused programs, reflecting different but complementary strategic priorities. The different approaches present an opportunity for the United States and Japan to complement one another with more coordinated smart power strategies, which can more effectively address emerging challenges to digital rights and youth engagement.
Synergy of Japanese and U.S. Smart Power
Technology is emerging as a crucial tool that shapes and influences international engagement and diplomacy, particularly in the context of soft power and digital rights. Currently, Nepal lacks strong, independent institutions, and recent youth-led digital rights protests demonstrate the growing importance of technology in political mobilization. Additionally, recent foreign aid cuts have constrained the United States’ ability to meaningfully engage in emerging democracies like Nepal. Although some Millennium Challenge Corporation projects were later cleared to continue, the initial pause of U.S. funding created doubt among Nepali policymakers on the United States’ commitment to long-term developmental partnerships. These risks have not only weakened U.S. soft power and its credibility but also created openings for China to position itself as a more consistent development partner through its Belt and Road Initiative.[13] Rather than simply resuming traditional assistance, a renewed investment in soft power coordinated with Japan would enhance legitimacy by combining democratic approaches to shape digital rights norms across South Asia. By leveraging their respective tools, such as foreign assistance, educational exchanges, and transnational capability building, the United States and Japan could develop a comprehensive strategy that reinforces multilateral cooperation and capacity building in accordance with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Past examples in Asia, such as the 2024 U.S.-Japan-Philippines trilateral initiative, demonstrate how U.S.-Japan coordination can yield more effective outcomes. To counterbalance China’s influence in the South China Sea, the United States supported joint military exercises and coast guard capacity building while Japan provided 1.6 billion yen in grant funds to upgrade the Philippines’ maritime capacity.[14] Additionally, Japan’s Official Development Assistance funded cultural exchange projects and infrastructure building in the Philippines, which advanced economic development while legitimizing Japan’s regional presence. While Nepal differs from the Philippines in strategic and military dimensions, this example illustrates how U.S.-Japan coordination can effectively combine educational, institutional, and civic initiatives into a unified strategy.
The U.S.-Japan partnership has the potential to foster a balanced, multifaceted approach, characterized by an exchange of diplomatic relations from both national perspectives, enhancing legitimacy and trust with local actors. Initiatives coordinated by the United States and Japan but led by existing Nepali institutions in education and digital empowerment would provide locally grounded engagement that addresses corruption without threatening Nepal’s sovereignty. In this way, Nepal’s sovereignty is respected while keeping the promise of a “free and open” Indo-Pacific region. By optimizing and coordinating their strategic efforts, the United States and Japan can jointly advance educational programs, infrastructural stability, and youth engagement, creating an alliance that addresses challenges in digital governance—an emerging framework essential for shaping these soft power initiatives.
Coordinating on Funding
Japan and the United States can coordinate funding in multiple ways. As seen with the protests in Nepal, Nepali youth have the capacity to drive change in education and digital rights, highlighting an entry point for international partnerships that support democratic resilience grounded in youth-led advocacy and structured digital initiatives. For example, Open Learning Exchange Nepal (OLE Nepal) is a nonprofit organization focused on increasing accessibility to education through e-learning and by offering digital libraries to school districts, providing an existing platform for international partners to expand digital spaces to the general public.[15] Similarly, Digital Rights Nepal (DRN) runs a digital rights school targeted at youth to teach them about digital literacy and advocacy, creating a pool of informed actors who help set digital standards for their communities.[16] These organizations can serve as crucial partners for the United States and Japan in efforts to ground initiatives in existing platforms to foster civic engagement and sustain democratic norms. Moreover, they provide practical reference points and guidelines for supporting digital rights and transparency with respect to Nepali sovereignty.
To help expand such local initiatives, the United States and Japan could launch a joint fund that provides sustained financial and technical support backed by existing Nepali organizations, such as OLE Nepal and DRN. Technical support could look like stable, long-term resources for digital literacy curricula, civic education modules, teacher training, and community outreach intentionally coordinated with Nepali organizations to maximize impact and build legitimacy. By combining Japan’s emphasis on educational and people-to-people initiatives with U.S. foreign assistance for institutional programming, this partnership would create a synergistic strategy that maintains public trust, encourages social cohesion, and builds local capacity. Given the violent escalation of the protests in Nepal, the U.S.-Japan partnership could also address the drivers of extreme protest violence, such as systemic governance failures and socioeconomic inequalities, by investing in local institutions that create trust and bridge the gap between the Nepali people and their government.
Shaping Digital Governance Norms
Even with greater financial support for civil society, digital governance across South Asian countries faces persistent obstacles, including vague laws, weak civil societies, and digital norms that are replicated or modeled after Global North systems that may not be fully appropriate elsewhere. This has resulted in nations like Nepal relying on authoritarian measures, which undermine human rights.[17] Additionally, traditional foreign assistance has at times contributed to the adoption of legal frameworks that assume democratic accountability and strong courts, conditions that may not fully exist in emerging democracies. In contrast, China’s model of digital governance emphasizes control and infrastructural power, promoting concepts of stability and cyber sovereignty. While effective within China’s centralized system, the model assumes stability and trust in existing institutions, limiting its attractiveness to civil society in other Asian countries. Taking into account this gap and changes in the global structure, the United States and Japan have opportunity to coordinate in strategically deploying soft power initiatives that directly address challenges in the South Asian region while creating practical models to establish norms for digital governance.
Nepal already has an organization, the Digital Freedom Coalition, formed in 2022 to coordinate among civil society groups on internet governance and digital rights; however, the coalition remains relatively new, limited in resources, and focused primarily on advocacy and summits. External support from a U.S.-Japan partnership could help transform this coalition into a more durable, locally grounded solution. Such funding would allow for an abundance of soft power tools to stay true to local realities and address gaps in Nepal’s digital rights governance through civil society partners and a shared standard for the digital space. The United States and Japan can work together to support initiatives, such as systematic training for youth leaders and educators and structured collaboration with journalists and researchers to combat online misinformation, building upon an institution with existing legitimacy and civic traction.
Conclusion
The U.S.-Japan partnership is well positioned to help equip Nepali youth with skills to identify misinformation and participate in local governance while strengthening government institutions. A trilateral partnership between the United States, Japan, and Nepal offers a practical path to promote democratic values to other nations in the Indo-Pacific in ways that enhance traditional aid approaches. In an era where technology is reshaping the global hierarchy, the United States will need to re-prioritize foreign aid as a tool for maintaining its international presence, making deeper coordination with Japan both timely and strategic. By supporting Gen Z-led initiatives in Nepal, the partnership can establish a blueprint for digital governance norms in emerging democracies, demonstrating how collaboration between global powers can shape a free and open Indo-Pacific.
About the Author
Sehar Alam taught English as an Assistant Language Teacher on the JET Program from 2024 to 2025 on Awaji Island in Hyogo, Japan. She holds a degree in International Studies with a minor in Political Science from California State University, Long Beach. Her research interests include South and East Asia, with fieldwork experience as a research assistant in Nepal exploring gender and education policy. On the JET Program, Sehar deepened her connection with both the Nepali and Japanese communities as she discovered cultural traditions such as the Koto through shared friendships.
References
[1] “Gen Z Protest in Kathmandu Against Corruption and Social Media Ban,” Kathmandu Post, September 8, 2025, https://kathmandupost.com/visual-stories/2025/09/08/gen-z-protest-in-kathmandu-against-corruption-and-social-media-ban.
[2] “Violent Protests Sweep the Nation; Offices and Leaders’ Residences Torched,” Kathmandu Post, September 10, 2025, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/10/violent-protests-sweep-the-nation-offices-and-leaders-residences-torched.
[3] Bhim Prasad Subedi, “Young People in Nepal Make Their Voices Heard, Playing a Role in Addressing Societal Challenges,” Rising Nepal Daily, January 10, 2025, https://risingnepaldaily.com/news/55193#:~:text=Young%20people%20in%20Nepal%20make,role%20in%20addressing%20societal%20challenges.
[4] “Nepal’s Long History of Political Instability,” Reuters, March 1, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nepals-long-history-political-instability-2026-03-02/.
[5] Gemma King, “Abe Shinzo: The ‘Father’ of the Indo‑Pacific,” Perth USAsia Centre, accessed November 19, 2025, https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-insights/abe-shinzo-the-father-of-the-indo-pacific/.
[6] A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, U.S. Department of State, November 4, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.
[7] Sharmila Thapa, “Soft Power and the Role of Higher Education in Shaping Nepal-Japan Relations,” Asian and African Area Studies 22, no. 2 (2023): 262–285, https://www.asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dl/publications/no_2202/AA2202-04_thapa.pdf.
[8] Embassy of Japan in Nepal, “Nepali Students in Japan – A Century Ago (1902),” accessed November 19, 2025, https://www.np.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ja/11_000001_00415.html.
[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan Friendship Ties Programs ‘JENESYS,’” accessed March 23, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page24e_000354.html.
[10] Monalisa Adhikari, “Renewed American Engagement with Nepal’s Maoists,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, November 26, 2012, https://www.idsa.in/publisher/issue-brief/renewed-american-engagement-with-nepals-maoists.
[11] “U.S. Relations with Nepal: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, July 28, 2022, https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-nepal/?safe=1.
[12] Tanjid Osman, “U.S. Halts $329 Million in Aid to Nepal, Impacting 34 Development Projects,” Nepal Monitor, March 12, 2025, https://nepalmonitor.com/2025/03/12/us-halts-aid-to-nepal/.
[13] Sam Acharya, “The Consequences of Abandoning U.S. Foreign Aid: Nepal’s Dilemma Between the MCC and Chinese Influence,” A4Al, May 6, 2025, https://a4al.org/think-tank/the-consequences-of-abandoning-u-s-foreign-aid-nepal-s-dilemma-between-the-mcc-and-chinese-influence.
[14] The White House, “Fact Sheet: Celebrating the Strength of the U.S.-Philippines Alliance,” April 11, 2024, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/11/fact-sheet-celebrating-the-strength-of-the-u-s-philippines-alliance/; “Japan Grants Philippines Funding to Boost Naval Capabilities,” BSS News/AFP, December 5, 2024, https://www.bssnews.net/international/228544/Japan-grants-Philippines-funding-to-boost-naval-capabilities.
[15] Open Learning Exchange Nepal, “Who We Are,” accessed November 19, 2025, https://www.olenepal.org/who-we-are/.
[16] Digital Rights Nepal, “About Us,” accessed November 19, 2025, https://digitalrightsnepal.org/about-us/.
[17]Digital Governance and Rights in South Asia and the Path Forward,Tech Global Institute, February 2025,https://techglobalinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Digital-Governance-and-Rights-in-South-Asia-and-the-Path-Forward.pdf
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JETs on Japan is a partnership between USJETAA and Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA that features JET alumni perspectives on US-Japan relations. on a variety of topics relevant to US-Japan relations. The publication elevates the awareness and visibility of JET alumni working across diverse sectors and provides a platform for JET alumni to contribute to a deeper understanding of US-Japan relations from their fields.
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