Countering Gray-Zone Competition: Comparing U.S. and Japan Responses
Click here to view and download this article as a printable pdf. (coming soon)
Connor McKenzie (Hyogo, 2016-2019)
Regional competition and strategic decision-making in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly unfolding in murky domains, often described with terms such as gray-zone. State and nonstate actors rely on these ambiguous tactics and strategies to exploit and coerce targets without engaging in direct physical conflict, evoking the gray-zone between war and peace. For instance, maritime incursions, cyber intrusions, and coercive economic measures exemplify the pressures employed by Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against competitors in the Pacific.(1) Even though the United States and Japan have strengthened their alliance ties, they must now redouble their efforts to deepen cooperation and coordination to effectively deter the upsurge of gray-zone competition and tactics from the PRC and others that increasingly blurs the boundary between competition and irregular warfare.
Defining the Gray-Zone
Through a spectrum of coercive activities, aggressive states seek to achieve strategic goals without triggering armed conflict. Perpetrators blend military, economic, legal, technological, and informational tools in order to operate in plausible deniability.(2) These malign influence tactics aim to exploit the vulnerabilities of target states, international laws or standards, and the target’s unwillingness to risk escalation.(3) Targets often become mired in determining proper attribution and a proportional response—delays that favor the aggressor. Aggressive state and nonstate actors use this ambiguity as a deliberate interaction tool, thus creating the gray-zone.
Modern technology transforms the character of gray-zone competition and presents novel challenges. Globalized networks and economies, military and technological capabilities, as well as legal complexities dramatically amplify and alter the scope, speed, and predictability of coercive methods.(4) States attempt to mask their actions as singular incidents—such as airspace violations—when they are actually using them as parts of gradually unfolding campaigns of prolonged pressure.(5) Ironically, the same institutions and frameworks that are designed to keep the peace and discourage active conflict among states also provide coverage for malign actors to operate in ambiguity and deny that they are engaged in aggression.
Formulating a Response to Gray-Zone Competition
Although states continue to develop comprehensive tools to identify, attribute, and monitor gray-zone activities, many increasingly view deterrence as a firmer resiliency strategy. Effective deterrence requires proactive strategies to counter coercion rather than getting bogged down in efforts to decipher and prepare individual responses to each new aggression. Deterrence mechanisms, like denial of leverage, reduce the appeal and benefits of aggression while raising the costs, denying an aggressor’s ability to exploit gaps. Effective deterrence also requires a collective response to dissuade adversarial states from risking retaliation.(6)
The challenge for many democracies, like the United States and Japan, lies in their ability to coordinate across government agencies, private sector actors, and international partners to mount effective deterrence.(7) Malign actors like the PRC, which are often equipped with authoritarian and centralized systems, can more effectively and quickly marshal their domestic resources.(8) Although authoritarian systems allow expediency, democratic governments do possess strengths when adopting deterrence strategies, utilizing whole-of-society, multilevel, and multilateral resiliencies.(9)
Comparative Analysis: Japan and the United States – Resilience Across Domains
Both Japan and the United States are adopting more proactive and dynamic postures to address gray-zone competition and threats, especially related to the PRC. For any analysis to effectively counter or prepare for gray-zone coercion, both countries should consider five domains of power and vulnerability: 1) strategic and institutional, 2) defense and security, 3) economic and technological, 4) cyber and informational, and 5) civil society and grassroots. These domains reflect where malign actors, such as the PRC and Russia, utilize exploitative gray-zone tactics and where Japan and the United States must craft resiliencies against coercion. The following sections detail each nation’s efforts to counter gray-zone activities within each domain, highlighting where they converge or diverge and identifying opportunities for deeper collaboration.
Strategic and Institutional Policy Domain
How governments conceptualize gray-zone challenges determines their ability to coordinate across domains to mount effective responses. The PRC’s sustained pressure campaign against Taiwan illustrates how a centralized political system enables a multidomain approach to achieve a strategic goal, integrating military, economic, legal, and informational tools. Beijing utilizes maritime and airspace incursions, cyber operations, and economic pressure against Taiwan while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.(10)
As democracies, it is harder for Japan and the United States to coordinate among all of their governmental institutions, but they have made great efforts to reframe and focus on gray-zone competition as a central security issue.(11) Recent domestic efforts and policies focus on strengthening links between national security and economics.(12) On an international level, U.S. allies and partners have made efforts toward multilateral interoperability among alliance members and allies with deeper integration through common systems and standards for security, not merely coordination.(13)
While the United States and Japan have both adopted more whole-of-government approaches in their policies towards the PRC, they still diverge on several key points, mostly due to differences in their domestic institutional structures. In the United States, while military capabilities are less restrictive, fragmented decision-making structures across and between agencies complicate responses.(14) Japan faces constraints from its pacifist constitution despite expanding the way it interprets it to permit the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to engage in collective self-defense and help protect Japan’s allies.(15) Recent policy and rhetoric from the U.S. administration signals a more confrontational and unilateral approach, which stresses stronger alliance partnerships and burden-sharing, though the use of tariffs and other economic pressures may create friction rather than engagement.(16)
On the international stage, the United States and Japan can build on past progress by pursuing more unified strategies to balance PRC influence, including better engagement with both their domestic audiences and international partners. Substantive international dialogue, with Japan and the United States at the core, must include strengthening minilateral (e.g., Japan-Korea-United States) and multilateral partnerships (e.g., Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Despite skepticism from the current U.S. administration toward elements of the liberal international order, the long-term interests of Japan and the United States remain rooted in multinational cooperation and common international standards.
Security and Defense Domain
Although gray-zone threats and competitions avoid overt military conflict, robust defense and security capabilities, grounded in intelligence and innovation, remain vital to deterrence. Recent highly publicized incidents in the South China Sea between the PRC and the Philippines showcase Beijing’s willingness to advance territorial and economic claims through gray-zone tactics. These operations rely on an integrated maritime militia, blending military, coast guard, and even civilian fishing vessels to exert pressure and complicate decision-making.(17) Japan and the United States maintain one of the most robust and integrated security alliances in the world.(18) Japan expanded coordination between the SDF and its Coast Guard to increase awareness and response capabilities, particularly around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.(19) The United States often affirms the need to create security and defense responses that engage across domains and has expanded bilateral and multilateral exercises to increase partner interoperability.(20)
Both countries have opportunities to further increase collaboration and deepen cooperation. Regular joint exercises—both bilateral and multilateral ones—provide critical platforms upon which to build professional cooperation, interoperability, and trust.(21) Continued relationship building and realistic training can allow for effective collaboration between forces. In addition, further integration should also encourage and increase information sharing, especially across areas frequently targeted by malign actors for gray-zone activities and competition.
Japan and the United States should prioritize coordination that strengthens and links defense planning with civilian sectors, institutions, and community leadership. This whole-of-society approach would engage experts and public leaders alongside defense and security forces and help build trust in civil–military planning and operational preparedness.
Economic and Technology Domain
Since economic coercion and technological dependency are powerful tools of gray-zone pressure, Japan and the United States recognize the critical nature of protecting this domain. Japan’s attention to the severity of economic gray-zone coercion preceded that of other nations. In 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands, resulting in the arrest of the fishing boat’s captain. Among many responses, the PRC ceased exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan, alarming domestic industries, including Japanese automakers.(22)
Rapidly advancing industries and emerging technologies can reveal a lack of diversified supply chains, especially related to critical minerals and rare-earth elements, allowing adversaries to utilize economic dependencies and chokepoints for leverage.(23) Both Japan and the United States have implemented deterrence strategies and undertaken multilevel efforts to reduce supply chain dependencies and protect domestic innovations. These strategies include shifting supply chains and promoting economic statecraft to other middle-power partners.(24) Japan’s National Security Secretariat has pressured multiple ministries to adopt policies to promote economic security, strengthen critical infrastructure, and protect innovation.(25) The United States faces similar vulnerabilities and enacted major steps to fortify economic resilience, such as passing the CHIPS and Science Act in 2022 to promote domestic semiconductor production while restricting technology exports to strategic competitors.(26) Strategies focused on domestic production and “friendshoring” realign supply chains through trusted partners to discourage dependence on the PRC.(27)
Japan’s exposure to gray-zone coercion has shaped its focus on economic safeguards and environments with comprehensive policy frameworks.(28) Meanwhile, the United States perceives economic security and coercion through a strategic competitive nature, focusing efforts towards countering coercion, denying economic leverage, and utilizing punitive measures, such as tariffs.(29)
To move forward, Japan and the United States should advance joint cooperation on research and development for emerging technologies and their supply chains.(30) In addition, both governments should refine strategic messaging to ensure that economic security initiatives and policies are communicated domestically as necessary for national resilience and public welfare while internationally reassuring transparency and commitment to broader interests.(31)
Information and Cyber Domain
IIn the information and cyber domain, where attribution remains difficult, perpetrators utilize gray-zone competition and tactics to exploit and undermine infrastructure and societal trust. Recent reporting from Taiwan’s National Security Bureau details increased detection of generative artificial intelligence from the PRC flooding social media platforms with disinformation and “controversial messages,” which aim to deepen domestic political divisions.(32) Gray-zone activities increasingly exploit cyberspace and the information environment, eroding trust and disrupting infrastructure.(33)
Both Japan and the United States stress cyber and information security as central to confronting gray-zone activities in this domain. Japan’s Cybersecurity Strategy, overseen by the National Cybersecurity Office, promotes whole-of-government coordination, public–private information sharing, and international cooperation.(34) The United States integrates cyber resilience through “digital solidarity,” emphasizing deterrence by denial, limiting leverage or impact of an aggressor’s tactics, and building digital ecosystem security and multisectoral engagement.(35) Civil society organizations and research institutions play a larger role in the U.S. model, countering disinformation and fostering digital literacy.
Bureaucratic structures affect how change is driven. Japan’s response remains primarily government-driven, a more aggressive approach that may stem from proximity to adversaries and a lagging cybersecurity posture compared to the more quickly adapting U.S. intelligence community.(36) Japan’s Active Cyber Defense Law shifts toward a proactive cybersecurity strategy, providing authorities with greater powers for threat identification and private sector collaboration.(37) The United States leverages a more pluralistic network of private and civic actors.
In the coming years, the United States and Japan must continue to strengthen resilience in the cyber domain with multifaceted efforts. Technological and counter-information capabilities are vital to streamline information sharing, coordination, and response. Joint initiatives in norm-setting and resilient critical infrastructure can shore up vulnerabilities, such as subsea cable production and repair, security accreditation for social media platforms, and a bill of materials for codes and components.(38)
Civil Society and Grassroots Domain
Gray-zone campaigns also target civilian populations, exploiting vulnerabilities in society and influencing public opinion. These tactics strain institutions, local governments, and communities, eroding trust and damaging social cohesion.(39) In 2025, Japanese officials noted an increase in Russian state-run media and diplomatic channels’ use of Japanese language and even bots attempting to manipulate information and spread propaganda related to Upper House elections.(40) Recently, misinformation campaigns—not directly linked to Russia but following similar patterns—fueled speculation and fears of unlimited migration, which ultimately forced the Japan International Cooperation Agency to reverse and cancel an initiative actually aiming to foster international exchanges with African countries.(41) Addressing resilience in civilian spaces concentrates on empowering civil society by improving media literacy, building public trust, and increasing public threat awareness.(42)
Japan and the United States have both adopted approaches to strengthen resilience within the civil society domain. They view the public’s ability to resist gray-zone coercion as integral to national security. Consequently, they have directed deterrence towards improving digital literacy, reinforcing credible information systems, and investing in cybersecurity preparedness, especially among local communities.(43)
Divergences again appear in each country’s approach. The decentralized efforts of the United States incorporate and connect different levels of government, universities, nonprofits, and the private sector.(44) This web of organizations offers independent and important roles in addressing malign influences and generating public awareness. Recent initiatives encourage collaborative approaches, crafting an intricate information-sharing system and offering a flexible and innovative framework to tackle influence campaigns.(45) However, this complex network remains susceptible to conspiracy, social division, and propaganda.
Japan addresses civil society vulnerabilities through a more centralized, state-guided effort. Since 2022, the government explicitly calls for whole-of-government approaches in their National Security Strategy, utilizing government institutions to organize public campaigns and raise threat awareness.(46) This approach also presents structural weaknesses: lowering civil society engagement, hampering transparency, and preventing independent analysis of threats.(47)
Civil society is a vital domain. The public and citizens are a resource against aggression, not only a target.(48) Informing, investing in, and equipping the public to recognize and properly respond will be vital in crafting a resilient society instead of one in constant need of protection.(49) Shared opportunities could elevate civil society resilience through joint education and awareness initiatives, allowing for capacity building and information sharing.(50) Empowering different levels of civil society promotes mutual understanding, research, and strategizing between nongovernment actors.(51) Transparency for technology and social media platforms can shape standards thus deter malign efforts.(52)
Conclusions
Since malign actors like the PRC will increasingly use gray-zone activities as a tool for competition and leverage in a dynamic geopolitical landscape, Japan and the United States must continue to strengthen coordination and build resiliencies inside and outside of the government. Aggressive states with weaker militaries will seek to even the competition by slowly chipping away at physical and societal infrastructure. Comprehensively addressing resiliencies across societal, economic, or institutional domains can mitigate harms and anticipate coercive strategies. The future of competition will depend on a variety of factors, not solely military strength. Adopting proactive strategies of deterrence and denial diminishes the effectiveness of gray-zone competition as a tool of influence.
Through a variety of proactive resiliency strategies, Japan and the United States have each set strategic goals to mitigate coercive influences and campaigns. Those strategies include economic policy reforms, increased coordination, and strengthened informational frameworks. Building cohesion in and among domains presents a multitude of actionable opportunities through diversifying supply chains, optimizing information-sharing, developing resilient infrastructure, adopting effective messaging, and encouraging dialogue and transparency. Despite differences in approach, the United States and Japan should place even greater priority on the strategic imperative to build resilience and deepen collaboration.
About the Author
Connor McKenzie currently serves as a research assistant with the Pacific Forum, a non-profit foreign policy research institute based in Honolulu. Born and raised in Honolulu, HI, he attended the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, where he earned his B.A. in Political Science, and recently received his M.A. in International Relations at American University’s School of International Service through their online program. Connor served as an assistant language teacher from 2016 to 2019 in Hyogo Prefecture with the JET Program. Upon returning, Connor served as an administrative assistant at the Consulate General of Japan in Honolulu. His international experience also includes a semester with the study abroad program at Yonsei University in Seoul, South Korea.
References
(1) Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan Warns of China’s Military Moves as Biggest Strategic Challenge,” Associated Press , July 15, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/japan-china-us-north-korea-security-pacific-23f5c8e0b5f539dcf8b33261e74f7427; Justin McCurry, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Enters Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone,” The Guardian , June 9, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/09/chinese-aircraft-carrier-japan-exclusive-economic-zone-waters; Bonny Lin, et al., “A New Framework for Understanding and Countering China’s Gray-Zone Tactics,” RB-A594-1, RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA594-1.html; Jose M Macias III and Benjamin Jensen, “Signals in the Swarm: Data Behind China’s Maritime Gray-Zone Campaign Near Taiwan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/signals-swarm-data-behind-chinas-maritime-gray-zone-campaign-near-taiwan/.
(2) John Schaus, et al., “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion,” CSIS Briefs, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-works-countering-gray-zone-coercion; Richard W. Maass, “Legal Deterrence by Denial: Strategic Initiative and International Law in the Gray Zone,” Texas National Security Review 8, no. 3 (2025): 54–73, https:// doi.org/10.1353/tns.00005.
(3) Schaus, et al., “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion.”
(4) Macias III et al., “Signals in the Swarm”; Monika Wohlfeld, Benjamin P. Nickels, and Benjamin Jensen, “NATO and Instrumentalized Migration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-instrumentalized-migration/.
(5) Schaus, et al., “What Works: Countering Gray Zone Coercion.”
(6) Scott W. Harold, et al., The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains , RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF379/RAND_CF379.pdf/.
(7) Craig Singleton, “Combatting PRC Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive, and Deceptive Behavior in the Indo-Pacific,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), October 7, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/10/07/combatting-prc-illegal-coercive-aggressive-and-deceptive-behavior-in-the-indo-pacific/.
(8) Christopher B. Johnstone, “How Interagency Campaigns can Counter Chinese Gray-Zone Incursions in the Pacific,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-interagency-campaigns-can-counter-chinese-gray-zone-incursions-pacific/.
(9) Johnstone, “How Interagency Campaigns Can Counter Chinese Gray-Zone Incursions in the Pacific.”
(10) Liz Lee and Jeanny Kao, “China Pressures Taiwan with Trade Accusations and Warplanes a Month before Election,” Reuters , December 15, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-accuses-taiwan-unfair-trade-barriers-month-before-election-2023-12-15/.
(11) “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of War, Dec 09, 2021, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2866963/concept-of-integrated-deterrence-will-be-key-to-national-defense-strategy-dod-o/
(12) “Concept of Integrated Deterrence,” U.S. Department of War.
(13) Harold, et al., The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion ; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan,” January 20, 2025, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-japan/
(14) Clementine Starling-Daniels and Julia Siegel, “The Future of U.S. Security Depends on Owning the Gray Zone: Biden Must Get It Right,” Atlantic Council , June 10, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/hybrid-warfare-project/the-future-of-us-security-depends-on-owning-the-gray-zone-biden-must-get-it-right/.
(15) James Kraska, “Japan’s Legal Response in the Gray Zone,” The Diplomat , August 6, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/japans-legal-response-in-the-gray-zone/.
(16) Meghann Myers, “New National Security Strategy Could Redefine Homeland Defense: Experts,” Defense One , October 23, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/10/new-national-security-strategy-could-redefine-homeland-defense-experts/409024/; “Statement on the Development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4172735/statement-on-the-development-of-the-2025-national-defense-strategy/; Christian Datoc, “Trump Second-Term China Policies Are Confusing Hawks and Beijing,” Washington Examiner , September 12, 2025, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/white-house/3803588/trump-second-term-china-policies-are-confusing-hawks-and-beijing/.; Ryan Fedasiuk, “The War for America’s China Policy,” American Enterprise Institute.
(17) Helen Davidson, “China’s Maritime Militia: The Shadowy Armada Whose Existence Beijing Rarely Acknowledges,” The Guardian , June 13, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/13/china-maritime-militia-explainer-south-china-sea-scarborough-shoal/
(18) U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan.”
(19) “Japan Boosts Maritime Defenses amid PRC’s Senkaku Islands Coercion,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, May 2024, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2024/05/japan-boosts-maritime-defenses-amid-prcs-senkaku-islands-coercion/.
(20) “2022 National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Defense Review,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 27, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.
(21) Brad Lendon, “Exercises Show Washington Keeping Alliances Strong as Pacific Adversaries Bring New Threats,” CNN , September 15, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/16/asia/us-japan-south-korea-exercises-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/.
(22) Tatsuya Terazawa, “Japan and Rare Earth Minerals: Building Resilience,” World Economic Forum, October 13, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/; River Akira Davis and Kiuko Notoya, “How Japan Built a Rare-Earth Supply Chain Without China,” The New York Times , December 8, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/08/business/japan-rare-earths-lynas.html/.
(23) Edlyn V. Levine and Fiona Murray, “The U.S. Needs a New Economic Security Strategy to Stay Competitive,” MIT Technology Review, July 30, 2024, https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/07/30/1095439/usa-economic-security-competitiveness/.
(24) “Fact Sheet: The U.S.–Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership,” The American Presidency Project, 2024, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-the-us-japan-competitiveness-and-resilience-core-partnership; David Elliott, “What Are Middle Powers and Why Do They Matter?” World Economic Forum, January 26, 2024, http://weforum.org/stories/2024/01/middle-powers-multilateralism-international-relations/.
(25) Charles Lichfield, “How Japanese Economic Statecraft Has Shifted from Promotion to Protection,” Atlantic Council, June 6, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-japanese-economic-statecraft-has-shifted-from-promotion-to-protection/; “Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Act and the Implications for Businesses,” Strategic Comments 28, no. 8 (2022): viii–ix, https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2022.2157625
(26) Michelle Schulz, “Passage of the CHIPS and Science Act: What Does This Mean for U.S. Export Controls?” Reuters , September 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/passage-chips-science-act-what-does-this-mean-us-export-controls-2022-09-07/.
(27) Levine and Murray, “The U.S. Needs a New Economic Security Strategy to Stay Competitive.”
(28) Kazuaki Nagata, “Takaichi Orders Review of Japan’s Economic Security Law amid Rising Threats,” The Japan Times , November 7, 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/business/2025/11/07/economy/takaichi-economic-security/.
(29) “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Declares National Emergency to Increase Our Competitive Edge, Protect Our Sovereignty, and Strengthen Our National and Economic Security,” The White House, April 2, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-declares-national-emergency-to-increase-our-competitive-edge-protect-our-sovereignty-and-strengthen-our-national-and-economic-security/.
(30) Dani Belo, “Conflict in the Absence of War: A Comparative Analysis of China and Russia Engagement in Gray Zone Conflicts,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 26, no. 1 (2020): 73–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2019.1644358.
(31) Haruka Satake, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the World: Adapting the U.S.-Japan Alliance to Emerging Geostrategic, Economic, and Technological Challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Beyond,” Stimson Center, March 27, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/the-us-japan-alliance-in-the-world/; U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee: Strengthening Economic Security and the Rules-Based Order,” press release, July 29, 2022, https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-u-s-japan-economic-policy-consultative-committee-strengthening-economic-security-and-the-rules-based-order/.
(32) “Taiwan Says China Using Generative AI to Ramp up Disinformation and ‘Divide’ the Island,” Reuters, April 8, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-says-china-using-generative-ai-ramp-up-disinformation-divide-island-2025-04-08/.
(33) Koichiro Komiyama, “Norms in New Technological Domains: What’s Next for Japan and the United States in Cyberspace,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 17, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/norms-new-technological-domains-whats-next-japan-and-united-states-cyberspace/.
(34) Adam Dobell and Grace O’Neill, “Japan’s New Active Cyber Defense Law: A Strategic Evolution in National Cybersecurity,” Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law, June 5, 2025, https://www.centerforcybersecuritypolicy.org/insights-and-research/japans-new-active-cyber-defense-law-a-strategic-evolution-in-national-cybersecurity/.
(35) “The United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy Towards an Innovative, Secure, and Rights-Respecting Digital Future,” U.S. Department of State, May 6, 2024, https://2021-2025.state.gov/united-states-international-cyberspace-and-digital-policy-strategy/.
(36) Julia Voo, Irfan Hemani and Daniel Cassidy, National Cyber Power Index 2022 (Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, September 2022), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/national-cyber-power-index-2022/.
(37) Komiyama, “Norms in New Technological Domains”; Jun Osawa, “New Legislation Signals Japan’s Shift to ‘Active’ Cyber Defense,” Nippon.com, August 7, 2025, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01147/.
(38) Erin L. Murphy and Matt Pearl, “China’s Underwater Power Play: PRC’s New Subsea Cable-Cutting Ship Spooks International Community,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-underwater-power-play-prcs-new-subsea-cable-cutting-ship-spooks-international.
(39) Sascha‐Dominik Dov Bachmann, Dries Putter and Guy Duczynski, “Hybrid Warfare and Disinformation: A Ukraine War Perspective,” Global Policy 14, no. 5 (2023): 858–69, https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13257; Elisabeth Braw, “Countering Aggression in the Gray Zone,” Prism 9, no. 3 (2021): 62–75, https://www.16af.af.mil/Newsroom/Article-Display/Article/2848252/countering-aggression-in-the-gray-zone/
(40) “Russian State Media, Diplomatic Offices Drastically Increase Japanese-language Content as Kremlin Wages Information War,” The Yomiuri Shimbun: The Japan News, October 8, 2025, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20251008-285336/; Yukana Inoue, “Concerns Grow in Japan over Possible Russian Interference in Sunday’s Election,” The Japan Times, July 18, 2025, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/07/18/japan/politics/russia-influence-japan-election/.
(41) “Why Did JICA Withdraw from Its Japan-Africa ‘Hometown’ Exchange?” NHK World-Japan 1, September 25, 2025, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/4273/.
(42) Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann, “Taiwan’s Whole-of-Society Defence Resilience Model and Beijing’s Grey-Zone Aggression,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, April 15, 2025, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/taiwans-whole-of-society-defence-resilience-model-and-beijings-grey-zone-aggression/.
(43) Maass, “Legal Deterrence by Denial,” 66.
(44) “Strategic Plan,” Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Homeland Security, accessed February 24, 2026, https://www.cisa.gov/strategic-plan.
(45) Saskia Brechenmacher, “Defending Civic Space in the United States: Lessons Learned Around the World,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 9, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/defending-civic-space-in-the-united-states-lessons-learned-around-the-world?lang=en.
(46) Cabinet Secretariat, Japan, National Security Strategy of Japan, December 16, 2022, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/national_security_strategy_2022_pamphlet-e.pdf.
(47) Brechenmacher, “Defending Civic Space in the United States.”
(48) Elisabeth Braw, “Grayzone Warfare Offensive Widens as the West Dithers,” Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), October 21, 2024, https://cepa.org/article/grayzone-warfare-offensive-widens-as-the-west-dithers/.
(49) Katharine A.M. Wright, “Realising Societal Resilience for a Whole of Society Approach to Defence,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 14, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/realising-societal-resilience-whole-society-approach-defence; Michael A. Rostek and Peter Gizewski, “Deterrence Through Whole of Society Resilience: Meeting the Challenge of Hybrid Threats in the Grey Zone,” research report, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University (Canada), 2025, https://www.queensu.ca/cidp/publications/research-reports/deterrence-through-whole-society-resilience-meeting-challenge-hybrid.
(50) Linda S. Lourie, “Navigating Gray Zone Strategies, Strategies to Address Hybrid Warfare,” interview by Christopher Isham, Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/event/navigating-gray-zone-strategies-address-hybrid-warfare/.
(51) Jennifer Staats, Johnny Walsh and Rosarie Tucci, “A Primer on Multi-track Diplomacy: How Does It Work?” United States Institute of Peace, July 31, 2019, https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/primer-multi-track-diplomacy-how-does-it-work/.
(52) Komiyama, “Norms in New Technological Domains.”
About JETs on Japan
JETs on Japan is a partnership between USJETAA and Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA that features JET alumni perspectives on US-Japan relations. on a variety of topics relevant to US-Japan relations. The publication elevates the awareness and visibility of JET alumni working across diverse sectors and provides a platform for JET alumni to contribute to a deeper understanding of US-Japan relations from their fields.
*Published articles are the opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJETAA or Sasakawa USA.
